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Definitely a Fight, But Not to the Last Man
Hugh Sebag-Montefiore correctly notes that multi-
tudes of books already have been written about the evac-
uation of the British and French troops from Dunkirk in
May and June 1940. He argues, however, that these ac-
counts generally have neglected the crucial role of the
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in making this escape
possible. He agrees that great credit must go to Adm.
Bertram Ramsay, the Royal Navy, and almost one thou-
sand small boat owners who actually moved the belea-
guered troops from France to England. Nevertheless,
he asserts, without the BEF, there would have been no
evacuation, or at least a much smaller number of troops
would have escaped from the jaws of the Wehrmacht.
The evacuation is a well-examined incident. What dis-
tinguishes this volume from its many predecessors, how-
ever, is the inclusion of hundreds of first-hand, sharp-
end-of-the-stick reports by members of the BEF.
Sebag-Montefiore, who trained as a barrister and
whose brother, Simon, is a highly respected historian of
Russia and Joseph Stalin, jumped into the crowdedWorld
War II history market in 2000 with an esteemed book on
Enigma code-breaking. His current book is a lengthy,
first-rate account of the Dunkirk evacuation that focuses
intently on an undeniably bitter defeat, one that was
soon to transmogrify nearly into a victory in the British
imagination. This “miracle of deliverance” (as Winston
Churchill famously put it) boosted British morale. Yet, it
would not have been possible without the efforts of the
BEF and the willingness of many on its roster to die, or
become prisoners of war, in order to save their comrades.
Sebag-Montefiore traces how the 338,226 individu-
als were evacuated from Dunkirk between May 26 and
June 4, 1940. British ships rescued more than 200,000 ad-
ditional Allied troops from other French ports such as
Cherbourg and Brest, but as he notes, these later evac-
uations have never penetrated the public imagination.
John Vereker Lord Gort, the head of the BEF, was one
of the evacuees and soon came to be regarded as a hero
despite the disaster that had afflicted the BEF under his
command. Churchill had to restore a sense of perspec-
tive to the tragic, but strangely uplifting situation, with
a further admonitory aphorism: “Wars are not won by
evacuations.” Even so, along with the Charge of the Light
Brigade, Dunkirk has become one of Britain’s favorite
military disasters.
The accounts of the events leading up to the evacu-
ation are detailed in the book, especially where British
troops are concerned. We learn of a British officer blow-
ing his fox-hunting horn as a signal for his troops to fire;
a private who lost an arm in the battle ending up scrub-
bing floors after the war because he was pushed out of
his old job; the Duke of Northumberland waving his ash
stick to urge his troops forward, but in so doing being
killed because he rashly exposed himself to fire; a popular
and sometimes incorrigible Welsh Guards officer bring-
ing two greyhounds with him to France and later win-
ning the Victoria Cross posthumously. Often, these are
stories that have not been told before. First-hand tes-
timony pervades the 496 pages of history and analysis,
supplemented by an interesting section entitled “What
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Happened to … after the War? ”, plus a set of twenty-
one detailed maps, statistical appendices, and ninety-
five pages of admirably discursive and useful footnotes.
One might contest Sebag-Montefiore’s interpretation of
events, but there is seldom doubt about the sources of his
information.
Sebag -Montefiore is hard on the French, whom he
scores repeatedly for pusillanimous fighting, inadequate
training, and bad decision-making. Indeed, the author
concludes that the evacuation and surrounding events
“were the consequence of mistakes made by French gen-
erals and politicians” (p. xi). He lambastes French lead-
ership for not reacting properly to the Mechelen incident
on January 10, 1940, when the Belgians retrieved from a
crashed German military plane a copy of what on that
date was the German invasion plan for western Europe.
He argues that the French should have concluded that
the Germans would abandon what was in many ways a
rewrite of theWorldWar I Schlieffen Plan and in its stead
develop something new. This is one of several places
where he plows a bit of new historical territory, in this
case by means of discussing previously overlooked Ger-
man, Belgian, and Czech files on the issue. Related to
this issue are newly obtained interviews relating to Ab-
wehr Colonel Hans Oster’s warnings to the Allies about
the forthcoming German invasion. Ultimately, both the
French and British could not eliminate the possibility that
the Mechelen crash was altogether too convenient and
therefore constituted an elaborate hoax. Their inability
to decide also led them to discount Oster’s pointed warn-
ings of the impending German attack.
Other historians have covered most portions of the
May 1940 Anglo-French-Belgian-Dutch debacle in detail,
notably Gregory Blaxland from the British point of view
and Karl-Heinz Frieser from the German side.[1] Wor-
thy of note here is that Sebag-Montefiore’s explanation of
the famous German “stop order” outside of Dunkirk does
not coincide with Frieser’s more detailed research, which
backstops the argument that it actually was Adolf Hitler
rather than his generals who bears primary responsibil-
ity for the most important stop order–without which the
miracle at Dunkirk never would have occurred.
Sebag-Montefiore skewers Churchill for his poten-
tially disastrous, changing, and sometimes contradictory
military advice, and notes that within the space of a few
hours, Churchill sometimes serially ordered the BEF to
stand on defense, and counterattack, and withdraw. He
points out that the vacillating and politically sensitive
prime minister actually sent portions of the 1st Canadian
Division to France via Brest even after the Dunkirk evac-
uation, when it was abundantly clear that most British
troops in France either were going to be killed or made
prisoners of war. The author’s presentations of British
War Cabinet discussions on such matters, and the cabi-
net’s explorations of the requirements of British honor,
along the possibility of peace overtures, are detailed and
illuminating.
Nor surprisingly, therefore, Sebag-Montefiore eas-
ily demonstrates that both BEF commanders and their
French counterparts received confusing and sometimes
conflicting messages from the British command on fight-
ing, evacuating, and negotiating. Some of this confusion
was due to the inevitable fog of war, of course, but other
instances occurred because a portion of BEF troops had
been placed under French command. However, for a va-
riety of reasons (including inferior and frequently elusive
French leadership), the British chose not to obey French
orders. While Sebag-Montefiore exhibits little sympathy
for the French, it is small wonder that the French were
embittered by the events surrounding Dunkirk, though
almost 140,000 French troops were evacuated along with
approximately 200,000 British.
Representative of the author’s “let’s get the story
directly from participants” approach is his coverage of
the Le Paradis and Wormhout massacres perpetrated on
British POWs by theWaffen-SS. As a rareWormhout sur-
vivor reported, “they made us turn around so we were
actually shot in the back … the shot went right through
my body. I thought I was dead and I suppose I passed
out” (p. 360). Another remembered, “the Germans began
throwing grenades in. I had my right arm shattered by
one of the first explosions” (p. 359).
I do have an important reservation about the book,
however, and it relates to a significant fundamental:
its title, which, however stirring, is quite misleading.
Whether the “last man” in question was Belgian, British,
or French, there was relatively little fighting to the last
man in western Europe in spring 1940. Only in a few
cases did members of the BEF, Sebag-Montefiore’s fo-
cus, fight to the death. In reality, approximately 300,000
BEF members escaped to Britain (from all ports, includ-
ing Dunkirk) and another 30,000 surrendered, while only
11,010 died. These numbers reveal that fighting to the
death was seldom. A succession of “stop” orders issued
to the Wehrmacht saved the BEF, not the BEF fighting
to the last man. Sebag-Montfiore’s actual presentation
of the May 1940 events confirms this stance, but the ti-
tle chosen for his book does not. If, however, Sebag-
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Montefiore actually wished the title to convey a sense
that the BEF fought to its last man in France in 1940, then
unfortunately the evidence does not support this view.
Even though the gallant and productive Oxfordshire and
Buckinghamshire regiment (the “Ox and Bucks”) was in-
structed to fight to the last man, it did not do so. All
things considered, that probably was a good thing.
Sebag-Montefiore set out to illuminate the sometimes
heroic contribution of the BEF to the Dunkirk evaluation
and succeeds in doing so. Nevertheless, if one is look-
ing for dramatic new interpretations of the 1940 battles,
this is not the book to purchase. Even so, the author’s
clarification and spotlight on the role of the BEF are both
welcome and appropriate.
Note
[1]. Gregory Blaxland,Destination Dunkirk: The Story
of Gort’s Army (London: Kimber, 1973); and Karl-Heinz
Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the
West (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005). First pub-
lished as Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Mu-
nich: Oldenbourg, 1995).
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